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DOUBLE PUNISHMENT FOR BURGLARIOUS OFFENSES
Whether a criminal defendant, who has embarked upon a single
course of illegal conduct and in so doing has violated a number of
provisions of law, should be subject to consecutive sentencing on each
count is a complex problem. Such a defendant, within the strict
meaning of the law, has in fact violated each provision. However, he

has performed only one act with a single motivation.' .The problem
is most acute when a defendant is convicted of burglary2 and the

completed burglarious offense.3
In People v. Hicks,4 this difficulty was squarely faced. Hicks broke
into a home and committed three felonious sex offenses against a 14year-old girl.5 Four nights later he again broke into the same house
but was frightened away by the girl's father. Indicted for both burglaries and the three sex offenses, Hicks was convicted on all counts
and given consecutive sentences for each crime. He appealed, claiming
that by being sentenced to consecutive terms for the sex offenses and
the first burglary he was subject to double punishment 6 in contra'Use of the word "act" with this connotation is not unusual in criminal
law. Examples which spring readily to mind include robbery, abortion, bigamy,
contributing to delinquency, kidnapping, embezzling, and many types of assault.
'For purposes of this comment the term "burglary" will be used to describe
common law burglary, statutory burglary, and breaking and entering. Common law
burglary is the breaking and entering of the dwelling of another, in the night, with
intent to commit a felony. Statutory burglary generally is the entry at any hour
of any structure usable for storage of goods, with the intent to commit a felony or
any theft. Breaking and entering is a variation of statutory burglary, usually of a
less serious degree.
3
"Burglarious offense" means any crime, the intent to commit which motivated
a burglary.
Except as otherwise noted all cases cited herein will refer to burglary situations.
It is beyond the scope of this comment to attempt a consideration of the other
possible combinations of offense (e.g., felony-murder, kidnap-robbery, narcotics
possession-sale, etc.)
' 4 4 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). This decision has been vacated in 48
Cal. Rptr. 139, 408 P..d 747 (Sup. Ct. 1965), however, the new holding is apparently
identical.
'The offenses were lewd and lascivious acts in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §
286 (infamous crime against nature) and § 288a (oral-genital copulation).
"The term "double punishment" should be restricted to situations in which consecutive sentences are given on counts charging necessarily included offenses. A
necessarily included offense exists when certain constituent parts of a crime may be
removed, leaving the elements of another complete offense. State v. Marshall, 2o6
Iowa 373, 220 N.W. 1o6 (1928). The courts, however, also use the term "double
punishment" when they are speaking of consecutive sentencing for constituent
elements of a course of conduct even though such elements are not necessarily included in one another.
Concurrent sentences are not considered to be double punishment, for when a
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vention of California Penal Code section 654, which provides that
any act punishable under the different provisions of the Penal Code
may be punished under only one such provision.7 The' California
District Court of Appeals agreed with his contention and reversed the
judgment relating to sentencing for the sex offenses,s stating: "Insofar
as only a single act is charged as the basis for the conviction.., the
defendant can be punished only once." 9
Burglary is defined in part as an attempt to commit some other
crime.' 0 As a separate offense, it arose as an effort to compensate for
defects in traditional attempt law, which imposed significantly lighter
penalties. Entry with criminal intent as an independent substantive
offense pushes back the time at which the law can intervene effectively
and provides an opportunity for imposition of more severe penalties."
Under early English common law, theft by burglary was a merged
offense, 12 hence punishable as a single offense; but in the United
States, although ordinarily attempt merges in the completed offense,
such has not been the case with burglary.
Of the forty-five states which do not have a statute similar to California Penal Code section 654, the only major one still following the
English rule is Illinois. 13 A few other states apparently agree, but
have made no recent reported decisions.' 4 A majority of the states
agree that burglary is distinct from burglarious offenses for punishshorter sentence runs with a longer, "there is no punishment for the shorter; it
does not inflict upon a defendant any additional restraint or detention." People
ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 268, 159 N.Y.S.2d 203, 210, 14o N.E.2d
282, 288 (1957), and cases cited therein at 287.
'Cal. Pen. Code § 654. "An act or omission which is made punishable in different
ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal
or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or
omission under any other."
8
The maximum penalty for either sex crime or for burglary is life imprisonment, but the minimum sentence for burglary is 5 years, for the § 288a violation
3 years, and for violation of § 286 one year. Therefore, burglary is deemed the most
serious of the three crimes. (The sentence for the second burglary was affirmed.)
944 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
"Perkins, Criminal Law 166 (1957); 2 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure

§§

408-10 (1957).

"-Model Penal Code § 221.1, comment i (Tent. Draft No. ii,i96o).
2-4 Blackstone, Commentaries 240-41 (15th ed. 18o9).
"-E.g., People v. Squires, 27 Ill.
2d 518, 19o N.E.2d 361 (1963); People v. McMullen, 400 Ill.
253, 79 N.E.2d 470 (1948); People v. Fitzgerald, 297 111. 264, 13o N.E.
720 (1921).

"'Kaufman v. State, 189 Tenn. 315, 225 S.W.2d 75 (1949); State v. McClung,
35 W. Va. 280, 13 S.E. 654 (1891).
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ment purposes, 15 thus abandoning the English rule. But a number of
these states maintain that if the offenses are not charged in separate
counts of the indictment, only a single punishment may be awarded. 1
The reason for allowing separate punishment is that one offense is
not necessarily included in the other, hence no merger.' 7
Under federal law a single act may receive several punishments,' s
and burglary may be punishable as a merged offense, 19 depending upon
5E.g., Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470, 1O9 A.2d 89 (1954); State v. Byra, 128
N.J.L. 429, 26 A.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Wyatt v. Alvis, 73 Ohio L. Abs. 21, 136
N.E.2d 726 (Ct. App. 1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa.
102, 21 A.2d 920 (1941); Copeland v. Manning, 234 S.C. 510, 1o9 S.E.2d 361 (1959);
Benton v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 782, 21 S.E. 495 (1895).
Separate punishment for burglary is specifically, permitted by statute in four
states: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1005 (Repl. Vol. 1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.070 (1959):
N.Y. Pen. Law § 4o6; and Tex. Pen. Code art. 1399 (1948). Kansas and Missouri
expect separate punishments, but provide that if the burglarious offense is larceny
the sentence imposed shall not be more than 5 years greater than the maximum for
burglary alone. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-524 (1964); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 56o.11o (1959).
A number of states have statutes which permit consecutive sentencing for any
two offenses, one of which does not necessarily include the other: Fla. Stat. Ann. §
921.16 (1944); Iowa Code Ann. § 789.12 (1950); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 279, § 8 (1956);
Miss. Code Ann. § 2567 (1956); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-123.10 (1964); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 42-1-59 (Repl. Vol. 1964); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 897 (1964); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13,
§ 7032 (1959); Va. Code Ann. § 19.1-294 (Repl. Vol. 196o); and some states even
seem to require that sentencing be consecutive: Idaho Code Ann. § 18-308 (1948); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 54648o (1959).
10
E.g., Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470, 1o9 A.2d 89 (1954); Benton v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 782, 21 S.E. 495 (1895)7
" "The true test of whether one criminal offense has merged in another is not
(as is sometimes stated) whether the two criminal acts are 'successive steps in the
same transaction' but it is whether one crime necessarily involves another, as, for
example, rape involves fornication, and robbery involves both assault and larceny."
Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynsky v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 21 A.2d 920, 921 (1941).
'BGore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (held that Congressional intent was
to inflict multiple punishment for violations of narcotics law).
But see: Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (held that a single discharge of a shotgun constituted only one violation of assault statute even though
two federal officers were thereby wounded).
l'Interpreting the Federal Bank Robbery Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2113, the Supreme
Court held that "the gravamen of the offense is not in the act of entering [punishable by 1o-2o years], which satisfies the terms of the statute even if it is simply
walking through an open, public door during normal business hours. Rather the
heart of the crime is the intent to steal. This mental element merges into the
completed crime if the robbery is consummated." Prince v. United States, 352 U.S.
322, 328 (1957). Likewise, burglary and larceny from a post office have been held
to be a single transaction meriting but a single punishment. Munson v. McClaughry,
198 Fed. 72 (8th Cir. 1912).
But see: Morgan v. Devine, 237 U-S. 632 (1915) in which forcibly breaking into
a post office, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2115, was held to constitute a separate offense from a completed post office theft. But it should be noted that the question
presented in Morgan was actually one of double jeopardy and not merely one of
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the interpretation given to the statutes involved. When merger is
allowed, it is on the basis that the transaction is tied togeather by an
20
element essential to each of the offenses.
Four states have statutes essentially identical to that of California:
Alabama, 21 Arizona, 22 New York, 23 and Utah.24 These statutes seem
to have anticipated the Model Penal Code, 25 whose drafters state that
''since the severe penalties for burglary are devised largely to provide
aggravated penalties for theft committed by lawless intrusion, it is ir26
rational to cumulate theft and burglary penalties.
Alabama takes the California approach, at least in cases where the
burglarious crime has involved theft.2 7 California holds that if a
double punishment, although in Smith v. United States, 312 F.2d 119 (0oth Cir.
1963), it was interpreted as allowing such punishment.
A discussion of the difference between double jeopardy and double punishment
may be found in People v. De Sisto, 27 Misc. 2d 217, 14 N.Y.S2d 858, 874 (King's
County Ct. 1961).
1
Prince v. United States and Munson v. McClaughry, supra note 19. Accord:
Stevens v. McClaughry, 207 Fed. 18 (8th Cir. 1913), in which it was said that "two
or more separate offenses which are committed at the same time and are parts of a
single continuing . criminal act, inspired by the same criminal intent which is essential to each offense, are susceptible to but one punishment." Id. at 20.
2
-"Any act or omission declared criminal and punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law, shall be punished only under one of such provisions,
and a conviction or acquittal under any one shall bar a prosecution for the same
act or omission under any other provision." Ala. Code tit. 15, § 287 (1958).
""An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
sections of the laws may be punished under either, but in no event under more
than one. An acquittal or conviction and sentence under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1641

(1956)2"An act or omission which is made criminal and punishable in different ways,
by different provisions of law, may be punished under any one of those provisions,
but not under more than one; and a conviction or acquittal under one bars a
proescution for the same act or omission under any other provision." N.Y. Pen. Law

§ 1938).

1
"'An act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different
provisions of this Code may be punished under any one of such provisions, but in
no case can it be punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and
sentence under any one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any
other." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-23 (1935).
""A person may not be sentenced on the basis of the same conduct both for
burglary and for the offense which it was his purpose to commit after the burglarious
entry or for an attempt to commit that offense, unless the additional offense constituted a felony of the first or second degree." Model Penal Code § 221.1(3) (Tent.
Draft No. 11, 196o).
MId., Comment 6.
2Wade v. State, 166 So. 2d 739 (Ala. App. 1964); Wildman v. State, 165 So. 2d
396 (Ala. App. 1963), cert. denied, 276 Ala. 708 165 So. 2d 403 (1964). The earlier
case of Lawson v. State, 33 Ala. App. 333, 33 So. 2d 405 (1948), based the same rule
on the prohibition against double jeopardy, apparently overlooking the existence of
the state's statute against double punishment.
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"course of criminal conduct" causes the commission of more than one
offense, 28 the applicability of a statute prohibiting separate punishment should "depend upon whether a separate and distinct act can
be established as the basis of each conviction, or whether a single act
has been so committed that more than one statute has been violated ....It is the singleness of the act and not the offense that is
determinative."2 9 Whether such conduct is single or divisible "depends on the intent and objective of the actor." 30
People v. McFarland,31 the first case to adopt this Yeasoning in a
burglary situation, held that when the evidence is sufficient to support
convictions for burglary and larceny, the inference which the jury is
permitted to make is that the theft was the defendant's objective when
he committed the burglary. The only reasonable conclusion is that
the crime intended was the crime actually committed, unless there, is
evidence to show that not only was there a burglary with the intent
to commit one crime but that a second offense was decided upon after
the entry was complete. Thus, "the burglary, although complete before
the theft was committed, was incident to and a means of perpetrating
the theft," 32 and such incidence makes the entire transaction a single
"act" within the meaning of the statute.
The common law rule in New York would include larceny in the
8Neal v. State, 55 Cal. 2d 11, 357 P.2d 839, 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (196o) (arsonattempted murder). See cases cited in People v. Hicks, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
^'People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1, 8 (195 o ) (kidnapping-armed
robbery).
IqNeal v. State, supra note 28, at 843. The discussion of double punishment for
a series of acts was dictum since the court decided that defendafits had committed
only a single physical act.
"58 Cal. 2d 748, 376 P.2d 449, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962).
2Id. at 457. This problem arises often: People v. Sipult, 44 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965); People v. Moore, 44 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); People v.
Hicks, 44 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); In re Keller, 40 Cal. Rptr. 921 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1965); People v. Gay, 230 Cal. App. 2d 102, 40 Cal. Rptr. 778 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1964); People v. Niles, 227 Cal. App. 2d 749, 39 Cal. Rptr. 1i (Dist. Ct. App.
1964); People v. Collins, 220 Cal. App. 2d 563, 33 Cal. Rptr. 638 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963); People v. Frye, 218 Cal. App. 2d 799, 32 Cal Rptr. 699 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
People v. Kellert, 219 Cal. App. 2d 57, 32 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963);
People v. Giffis, 218 Cal. App. 2d 53, 32 Cal. Rptr. 215 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People
v. Keller, 212 Cal. App. 2d 210, 27 Cal. Rptr. 805 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (burglaryconspiracy); People v. Jones, 211 Cal. App. 2d 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. 429 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962);

People v. Griffin,

209

Cal. App. 2d

125 , 25

Cal. Rptr. 667 (Dist. Ct. App.

(burglary-possession of narcotics); People v. Jaramillo, 208 Cal. App. 2d 620,
25 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); People v. Dykes, 198 Cal. App. 2d 75, 17
Cal. Rptr. 564 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961); In re Dowding, 188 Cal. App. 3d 418, 1o Cal.
Rptr. 392 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
1962)

166

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIII

offense of burglaryA3 but such merger is now prohibited by a statute
which makes burglary separately punishable from the crime for which
entry was effected. 4 The New York Court of Appeals, however, apparently agrees in principle with the California interpretation of statutes
forbidding such separate punishment, for it has said that "if there were
merely a single inseparableact violative of more than one statute, or if
there were an act which itself violated one statute and was a material
element of the violation of another, there would have to be single
punishment."3 It is probable that should the legislature repeal the
law requiring separate punishment for burglary that the common law
rule would be reinstated by the New York Courts. 0
The courts in Arizona and Utah disagree with the California approach. Giving. narrow interpretation to the word "act," they view
37
the statute as prohibiting its application to the burglary situation,
and hold instead that by "act" is meant a single physical action or,
at most, a series of actions having identical components. 38 A 1965
example of this, approach is State v. Green,3 9 which, like Hicks,
the principal case, involved a burglary-sex offenses combination.
'."But where there has... been a conviction for the burglary, a plea of autre
fois convict would be a good answer and defense to a subsequent indictment for
the larceny which was committed at the same time and by means of the burglary. It
is all the same felony, and the lesser is merged and satisfied in the conviction of the
greater." People v. Smith, 57 Barb. (N.Y.) 46, 55 (1870).
'N.Y. Pen. Law § 406. People v. Snyder, 241 N.Y. 81, 148 N.E. 796 (1925).
United States ex rel. Bryant v. Fay, 211 F. Supp. 812 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); People ex rel.
Ody v. Wallack, 13 App. Div. 2d 556, 212 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1961); People ex rel. Hardin
v. Jackson, 8 App. Div. 2d 575, 183 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1959); People ex rel. Cannata v.
Jackson, 6 App. Div. 2d 919, 175 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1958); People v. Oliver, 4 App. Div.
2d 28, 163 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1957); People ex rel. Alione v. Morhous, 186 Misc. 912, 63
N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 1946); People ex rel. Patrek v. Ganter, 61 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup.
Ct. 1946).
"People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 159 N.Y.S.2d 20o3, 14o N.E.2d
282, 285 (1957) (robbery-assault).
The statutes are self-defeating only as to burglary. "Transaction" or "course
of conduct" crimes are recognized, but comparison of lower court decisions in N.Y.
seems to indicate that confusion exists regarding application of § 1938. Compare
People v. Saravese, 1 Misc. 2d 3o5, 114 N.Y.S.2d 816, 835-36 (Sup. Ct. 1952) with
People v. Zipkin, 202 Misc. 552, 118 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698-99 (Monroe County Ct.
(1952)-

"State v. Green, 403 P.2d 8o9 (Ariz. 1965); State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176; 349
P.2d 187 (196o); State v. Westbrook, 79 Ariz. 116, 285 P.2d 161 (1955) (attempted
burglary-cofnspiracy); State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262 (1962); Rogerson v.
Harris, iii Utah 330, 178 P.2d 397 (1947). It should be noted regarding the Utah
cases that although Jones purports to follow Rogerson, the statutes which they
construed were not the same.
3State v. Boodry, 96 Ariz. 259, 394 P.2d 196 (1964) (rape-incest); State v. Huntsman, 115 Utah 283, 204 P.2d 448 (1949) (rape-adultery-incest).
'98 Ariz. 254, 403 P.2d 809 (1965).
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Green's sentence included separate punishments for burglary and for
the rape that motivated that burglary. 40 He appealed, claiming that
by receiving consecutive sentences for both the burglary and the rape
41
he was being doubly punished.
The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed the sentences, reasoning
that "the crimes of burglary and rape do not have identical components. Their elements are entirely different, and therefore, A.R.S. §
13-1641 does not prohibit a sentence being meted out for each offense
even though both were committed as part of appellant's plan to rape
his victim. "42 In other words, since burglary could in theory be
committed without fulfilling the intent to rape, and a rape could
be committed without a burglary preceding it, the two crimes are
not necessarily merged.4 3 This conclusion is true only to an extent.
All states recognize that an offense committed after a burglary may
be other than a burglarious offense; for example, in Seiterle v. Superior Court44 the murders of two householders were held to be crimes
separate from illegal entry, kidnapping, and robbery because the stabbings were "impulsive," whereas the other offenses were contemplated and therefore merged. The distinctness of offenses is a matter
of proof, and to allow separate punishment on the mere possibility
that the crimes were separate seems to be unnecessarily harsh.
Although it is true that any offense which can be committed without an unlawful entry is not necessarily merged with burglary, still it
is possible that in a given situation a burglary would actually be
essential to the intended crime. Thus, in both Hicks and Green the
'First degree rape (8.1o yrs.), first-degree burglary (2 counts, 6-7 yrs. each).
He was also sentenced for unlawful mask (2 counts, 2-3 yrs. each), lewd and lascivious acts (2-3 yrs.), and aggravated assault (4-5 yrs.) Total sentence, 30-38 years imprisonment.
"Sentences for lewd and lascivious acts were also appealed on a recordation
technicality, but for tactical reasons the sentences for these acts and for unlawful
mask were not appealed as double punishment.
"403 P.2d at 811.
"The same reasoning was used to affirm consecutive sentences in the other appeals which sought to apply Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1641 and Utah Code § 76-1-23 to
burglary situations:
"Burglary and theft are two separate and distinct acts. To constitute burglary
it is not necessary that theft be committed ....
To consummate theft, it is essential
that after the burglary is completed, the additional act of actually stealing be committed .. .The elements constituting burglary and theft are entirely different.
One may be committed without the other." State v. Hutton 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d
187, 188-89 (196o).
"In the instant case the facts show i) a breaking and entering and 2) a larceny.
The entering did not include the larceny and the larceny independently was something else." State v. Jones, 13 Utah 2d 35, 368 P.2d 262, 263 (1962).
"57 Cal. 2d 397, 369 P.2d 297, 20 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1962).
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defendant's intent was to perpetrate a sex crime upon a particular
individual, and in each case it was actually necessary to commit a
burglary in order to reach the victim. Dividing this felonious sequence into a number of crimes for the purpose of punishing each
separately would appear to be sophistry, for almost any situation
can be abstractly fragmented. The punishment for the more serious
crime gave the court adequate punitive opportunity.4 5 The California
court sentenced for the punitively more serious offense; the Arizona
court's minimum sentence of thirty years was a cumulation of punishments for separate offenses. An essential difference between the two
approaches is that the Arizona court tied the hands of the parole
board, whereas if it had given an equivalent, or even greater sentence
for only the more serious crime of rape, then there would have been
a possibility of a parole at an earlier date should Green be thought
rehabilitated.
Another reason advanced for not interpreting burglary and the
subsequent crime as merged is the possibility that a felon might intend several crimes at the time of the burglary, one of which he conceals
until after jeopardy would ordinarily attach. 46 Thus, it is argued,
it would be possible that several crimes could be committed as part
of a single course of conduct and some of them go unpunished because not discovered early enough. The answer to this seems to be the
double jeopardy proposition that trial and punishment for burglary
do not bar trial for crimes not charged or necessarily included in
the burglary indictment.
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Gore v. United States,47 suggests that the elements of the offenses sought to be merged be examined, and that a judgment be applied which is based as much on
common sense as on strict juridical logic. He urges that caution be
taken against quick application of stereotyped formulas, for it is "too
easy and too arbitrary to apply a presumption for or against multiple
punishment in all cases or even to do so one way in one class of cases
48
and the other way in another."
The majority rule is clear that burglary and the subsequent bur"Axiz. Rev. Stat. § 13-614 (1956) and Cal. Pen. Code § 264 set punishment for
first degree rape at 5 and 3 years to life, respectively.
18Schauer, J., concurring and dissenting in People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748,
376 P.2d 449, 466, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 490 (1962), suggests that a burglar could commit a murder and a less serious crime as part of a single course of conduct, then by
confessing to the less serious crime and serving his sentence bar punishment for
the murder.
4'357 U.S. 386 (1958).
"Id. at 394-

